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Abstract 
 
Both ‘actions’ and ‘interactions’ can be considered as micro-operations that can be aggregated from a 
systemic perspective. Whereas actions operate historically, interactions provide the events 
retrospectively with meaning. Luhmann’s sociology of communication systems adds to the approach 
of symbolic interactionism the question of what global dimensions of communication mean for local 
interactions. When communication is functionally differentiated—for example, in terms of media—
tensions can be expected to develop between local organizations and global developments of 
communication structures. Interfaces enable us to translate selectively among (provisionally) 
stabilized representations, for example, in professional practices. ‘Big science’ and ‘high tech’ can be 
considered as organizational acculturations of an emerging level of sophistication in global 
communications. The global dimension remains a hypothesis, but entertaining this hypothesis of 
‘globalization’ restructures the local expectations.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The theoretical oppositions between Luhmann (1984) and Habermas (1987) were 
framed in terms of ‘systems theory’ versus ‘action theory’ (cf. Habermas & 
Luhmann, 1971). ‘Action theory’ may seem less alienating than ‘systems theory’ 
because ‘actions’ can be intentional. The analytical distinction between theories that 
are based on ‘action’ or ‘interaction’ as micro-operations of social systems, 
however, is more fundamental than the one between action and systems theory. 
Luhmann’s sociology can be considered as different from other systems-theoretical 
approaches because it assumes ‘interaction’ as the basic operation of social systems. 
 
Both ‘actions’ and ‘interactions’ can be considered as micro-operations that can be 
aggregated from a systemic perspective. Actions can be aggregated, for example, 
into ‘institutional agency,’ whereas interactions may become increasingly complex 
by operating upon one another in a non-linear mode. Action can also be considered 
as an operation integrating social systems historically (Parsons, 1937; Habermas, 
1981), while interactions may enable the actors to reproduce differentiation.  
 
For example, the constructivist Latour (1987) proposed to ‘follow the actors’ in 
terms of their actions. Actions are then used as a historical explanans. The 
observation of an interaction, however, assumes a perspective from which one can 
reconstruct the observable events (e.g., actions). Like action, interaction occurs in 
history, but the system of reference for interaction is necessarily an interhuman 
construct. Interaction is by definition reflexive. The two operations of ‘action’ and 
‘interaction’ cannot be reduced to each other because of this difference in their 
epistemological status. 
 
From an interactive or network perspective, one can attribute an action to an actor, 
but this attribution can also be reconsidered. Interaction potentially rewrites the past, 
for example, from the perspective of a (historical) present. ‘Interaction’ thus 
provides us with an evolutionary category that operates at the network level, 
whereas actions remain to be attributed to the historical development of agency in 
terms of individuals or groups who carry the evolution of systems of social 
interactions. While actions can be expected to vary, interactions tend to evolve into 
systems of mutual expectations. 
 
 
The double hermeneutics of sociology 
 
The epistemological difference between ‘action’ and ‘interaction’ was already 
fundamental to Weber’s Marx-critique. Marx focused on historical action and 
wished to make predictions on this basis. Weber raised the question of the 
‘sociological meaning’ of actions. From Weber’s perspective, sociology uses 
historical instances for understanding the operation of analytical constructs (e.g., 
‘idealtypes’). Against Marx, Weber (e.g., 1904 and 1917) maintained that the 
historical accounts cannot inform us about a system’s logic operating in history. The 
analyst ‘understands’ the actions in what can also be called a ‘verstehende 
Soziologie.’  
 
Understanding raises the question of how people and analysts construct meaning in 
interactions. A ‘double hermeneutics’ between the analyst’s and the participant’s 
level of action and accounting has since that time been a constitutive problem of 
sociology (Giddens, 1979). The dimension of external observation versus 
participation can be cross-tabled with the distinction between ‘interaction’ and 
‘action’ (Table 1). A participant can also be an observer, but the analytical status of 
an observation is different from that of participation. 
 
 Participation Observation 
Action actor report 
Interaction role discourse 
 
Table 1 
The generation of a double hermeutics in sociology 
 
From the perspective of reflexive interaction at the network level, ‘action’ by a 
participant can be considered as a role attributed to or carried by an actor. 
Expectations with respect to actors are constructed within the network of 
communications among the observers. The interactive networks operate in terms of 
non-linear feedback loops on actions. From an action theoretical perspective, 
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however, the network effects are attributed to the intentioned actors in terms of 
linear cause-effect relations. The unintended consequences of actions remain then 
unexplained. 
 
By considering communication as the unit of analysis—or more precisely as ‘the 
unit of operation’—of social systems, Luhmann’s sociology shares with symbolic 
interactionism a focus on interaction. Symbolic interactionism with its roots in 
American pragmatism (Blumer, 1969), however, has been strongly contrasted to 
social systems theory (Grathoff, 1978). Luhmann mainly added to symbolic 
interactionism the question of what global dimensions of communication may mean 
for local interactions. How and to what extent are the local or ‘first-order’ 
observations structured by higher-order communications? But in order to ground the 
next-order level, Luhmann defined the basic operation of social systems as ‘second-
order observations’: how does the network system enable us to make distinctions 
and to provide these distinctions with meaning at the network level? 
 
 
Symbolic Interactionism 
 
In his authorative study of symbolic interactionism, Herbert Blumer (1969, at p. 8) 
stated: 
 
The importance lies in the fact that social interaction is a process that forms human 
conduct instead of being merely a means or a setting for the expression and release 
of human conduct. 
 
Blumer traced the roots of the interactionist approach to George Herbert Mead’s 
reformulation of the self as the result of a process of social interaction (Mead, 1934, 
at pp. 26f.). The communicative structure pervades action. Society, as Cooley (1902) 
once argued, exists inside the individual in the form of language and thought.  
 
The basic unit of analysis in the interactionist account was defined as the joint act—
the interactional episode (Lindesmith, Strauss, & Denzin, 1949, 41975, at p. 4). The 
interactional episode is part of the larger society. In empirical studies, however, the 
larger social system was consistently treated as a result of interactions in micro-
situations. Blumer (1969, at p. 58), for example, stated:  
 
 However, in seeing the organization as an organization of actions symbolic 
interactionism takes a different approach. Instead of accounting for the activity of the 
organization and its parts in terms of organizational principles or system principles, it 
seeks explanation in the way the participants define, interpret, and meet the situations 
at their respective points. The linking together of this knowledge of concatenated 
actions yields a picture of the organized complex. 
 
The resulting ‘picture,’ however, has the status of an account that can be 
communicated. This communication is no longer necessarily confined to the situation 
in which it emerged. As noted, the epistemological status of an account is different 
from an observable action because the observational report is reflexively organized. It 
contains a knowledge claim that can be validated by the participants and/or as a 
contribution to a sociology. 
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The need for a bottom-up approach to the validation does not follow logically from a 
focus on ‘interactions,’ but it was implied in the programmatic preference of symbolic 
interactionism for the analysis of ‘micro-situations.’ Knorr-Cetina (1981, at p. 27), for 
example, argued that the ‘situational approach’ is the road sociology must take for 
methodological reasons, since: 
 
(...) unlike the natural sciences the social sciences cannot hope to get to know the 
macro-order conceived in terms of emergent properties: they are methodologically 
bound to draw upon members’ knowledge and accounts. 
 
How can an analyst understand ‘members’ knowledge and accounts’ other than by 
situating them in a context that has first to be (re)constructed from these same 
‘members’ knowledge and accounts’? A reflexive turn is implied that adds to the 
analysts’ understanding of the members’ accounts. Whereas the micro-constructivists 
demand—as a methodological constraint—that the interpretation be validated locally, 
the accounts feed back into the situation from a perspective. This analytical angle 
makes the observation reflexively available as an observational report in contexts 
other than the ones in which they originated and were validated. 
 
On the one hand, the micro-constructivists have substantiated their critique of systems 
approaches, arguing that in order to be useful for empirical research, a model should 
be able to account for the specificities of localized action and interaction. The focus on 
specific episodes has resulted in a richness of substantive understanding which cannot 
easily be brought into a systems perspective. The latter abstracts from the substance of 
the accounts by comparing them at the aggregated level. The reports can then be 
considered as contributions to a discourse. However, the accounts and not the actions 
reported within them are providing the variation from this perspective. 
 
On the other hand, the situationalist approach fails us if we wish to understand why 
interactions are ‘concatenated.’ Some authors in this tradition have tried to specify 
control as, for example, ‘alignment’ (e.g., Fujimura, 1987), but the control 
mechanisms of the social system (e.g., codification processes) cannot fully be 
specified from within the situations. The historical report of the sequence only reflects 
the dynamics that produced the sequencing. 
 
The systems perspective originates from taking a reflexive turn. Observations, for 
example, were defined by Luhmann (1984) from his second-order perspective as the 
operation of first distinguishing and then indicating the distinction made 
(“Unterscheiden und Bezeichnen”). The designation provides the distinctions with 
meaning. It should be noted that the operation of ‘observation’ thus defined implies 
two operations. By (re)combining the network operation with the historical 
information, the analytical perspective adds to understanding the historical cases. For 
example, one may also wish to raise the question why some things did not happen? In 
addition to the cases that happened to occur historically, one is sometimes—that is, 
under methodologically specifiable conditions—able to specify expectations about 
what might have happened. Historical accounts provide the systems theoretician with 
empirical materials for the formulation of hypotheses.  
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Structuration theory 
 
Some interactions are more likely to occur than others; previous interactions 
‘constrain and enable’ future interactions. ‘Structures’ seem to operate as constraints 
both statically, that is, at each moment in time, and dynamically, that is, over time. 
Giddens (1979) proposed in his ‘structuration theory’ that structure be considered as a 
virtual operation which ‘constrains and enables’ action ex ante and ‘aggregates’ 
actions ex post. However, Giddens deliberately refrained from a specification of this 
‘duality of structure’ as a virtual operation since—against Marxism and systems 
theory—the empirical sociologist should, in his opinion, foreground that ‘social 
reproduction has itself to be explained in terms of the structurally bounded and 
contingently applied knowledgeability of social actors’ (Giddens, 1981, at pp. 172 ff.). 
 
In order to prevent any specification of structure ‘outside time and space’ in empirical 
research, Giddens (1984) then recommended as a methodology that structure be 
described only historically and contextually, that is, substantively operationalized in 
terms of historical instances. In Giddens’s opinion, the mutual contingencies of 
structure and action can be studied by ‘bracketing’ the institutional dimension when 
the analysis is at the level of strategic conduct; and vice versa, the latter can be 
bracketed when one analyzes the former.1 So, the two perspectives are developed as 
different views of the same matter; the two pictures together would provide a fuller 
insight into the mutual contingencies. 
 
The definition of structure was thus shifted to ‘a rule of sociological method,’ but 
Giddens refused to draw the consequence of defining structure formally, that is, as a 
network operation. The ‘virtual operation’ of structure, however, is analytically 
different from its substantive instantiations. Giddens was himself aware of the 
problem that the core concept of his theory, that is, the ‘duality of structure,’ cannot be 
defined by using ‘bracketing’ (e.g., Giddens, 1979, at p. 95).  
 
In my opinion, structuration theory contains all the elements, but for programmatic 
reasons, it denies the analyst the possibility of specifying the operation of ‘structure’ at 
the level of a social system. Furthermore, Giddens warned against making structure 
the subject of sociological theorizing when he strongly formulated (1984, at p. 
xxxvii):  
 
There can be no doubt about the sophistication and importance of the work of some authors 
currently endeavouring to develop Parsons’s work in novel ways, particularly Luhmann and 
Habermas. But I think it is as necessary to repudiate the newer versions of Parsonianism as I 
do the longer established varieties of non-Parsonian structural sociology.  
 
 
Luhmann’s proposal 
 
Perhaps even more than Habermas, Luhmann has been deeply influenced by Parsons’s 
systems theory. Parsons considered ‘action’ as the integrating operator of social 
systems: the analytical dimensions of an action are instantiated and reorganized in the 
                                                 
1 Giddens (1979, p. 81) compares the concept of bracketing with epoche in the phenomenological 
tradition. 
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performative dimension. The identification of the system with observable action, 
however, has led to a reification of systems-theoretical approaches. Social systems 
could then be considered as historical phenomena (Münch, 1982).  
 
Although Parsons (1952) argued strongly that society should be considered as a 
category sui generis, from his perspective the social remains another dimension of an 
otherwise naturally given system. The social system was not further analyzed as an 
interactive and, therefore, cultural construct among human beings. Luhmann (1984) 
confronted this problem of confusing the historical level with the analytical by 
proposing to consider ‘communication’ as the running operator of the social system. 
Interaction can then be considered as a basic operation for producing meaning within 
social systems.  
 
This proposal thoroughly solves the puzzle of combining the explanatory power of 
systems theory as a theory about communication and control with the richness of the 
descriptions in studies from interactionist traditions. The social system contains 
instances that were historically realized, but it can be considered as a multi-
dimensional space of other options that could perhaps be realized in the future. The 
focus on the dynamics of the network enables us to integrate the micro- with the 
macro-approach. Middle-range approaches can also be appreciated because the 
analytical definition of the systems of reference becomes crucial to the specification of 
a research design. 
 
Which networks can be considered as relevant for studying a specific research 
question? How can networks be delineated? Because of the freedom to specify 
expectations on analytical grounds, Luhmann’s sociology is very different from those 
of Giddens or Habermas. The latter begin with historical observations, while 
Luhmann’s theorizing begins with expectations that are based on ‘horizons of 
meaning’ (Luhmann, 2002b; cf. Husserl, 1954). This theory therefore allows for 
formalization without losing the relation to the interactive accounts. The interactive 
accounts provide the variation. From a network perspective, ‘second-order 
observations’ refer to a theory about possible observations. The observables can then 
be evaluated in relation to the theoretical expectations. 
 
The social system is constructed bottom-up, but in a network mode. The interactions 
at the network level add uncertainty to the aggregations of lower-order units. In the 
formal language of statistics one can formulate that the aggregations contain ‘within 
group’ variation, but that one expects also ‘between group’ variation. A classical 
example is that of a school expected to contain more variation than that contained in 
the sum of the classes within it. One can expect additional variation between the 
classes, since the classes contain also structural variation (Leydesdorff, 1995).  
 
The structural dimensions of the system may initially (and partially) be latent for the 
agents involved, but as the networks develop by further aggregating, the architecture 
of a social system can become more apparent (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968). A 
perceptive analyst is able to develop hypotheses about the latent dimensions of a 
virtually operating structure. The inference by the micro-constructivist that one would 
be unable to specify ‘organizational principles or systems principles’ accounting for 
the activity of individuals is no longer valid from this perspective. 
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The organizational principles can be explained historically in terms of how they have 
been constructed at the network level. They are not given naturally, but constructed 
historically. However, once constructed the constructions may begin to feed back on 
agency in a mode very similar to Giddens’s ‘duality of structure.’ As against Giddens, 
however, the focus in Luhmann’s constructivism is not on the construction process, 
but on what is constructed, that is, the social system. Note that our knowledge about 
this system has the status of a hypothesis. The social system should not be reified; it 
remains operational and under (re)construction. 
 
Analytical theorizing about this operation can be informed by historical observations, 
but the systems theoretician takes a reflexive turn. In my opinion, Luhmann’s 
sociology should primarily be read as a theory that informs sociological hypotheses by 
structuring them into a coherent framework. Any knowledge claim, however, remains 
itself an operational part of the social system, that is, as another account (Latour, 
1988). From this perspective, sociological theorizing can be considered as 
contributing to empirical research by providing knowledge claims or hypotheses to be 
validated. As Luhmann (2002a, at p. 75) formulated it himself: 
 
The soundness of this reflection, however, arises—and this can still be ascertained by this 
reflection—from a form of social differentiation that no longer allows for any binding, 
authoritative representation of the world in the world or of society within society. 
 
 
Differentiation and integration 
 
Accounts by participants to the membership contain an address different from 
accounts of sociological observers who wish to contribute to the development of their 
discipline. The social system differentiates in terms of roles. Neither ‘the system’ nor 
‘the situation’ (nor ‘everyday language’ or ‘action’) necessarily integrates the different 
(sub)systems. ‘Integration’ is a special case that requires explanation. In a pluriform 
society, one expects frictions among discourses (based on observations and reports 
from different perspectives). The expected frictions can be observed, for example, in 
the case of competing paradigms. 
 
The structural consequences of previous actions and interactions build up over time. 
People are historically constrained and enabled by structures that have been 
constructed at the supra-individual level. These structures are reproduced (or not) 
because of their institutionalized social functions. These insights about structure and 
function, of course, stem directly from Parsons. However, when Parsons’s original 
‘unit of action’ is replaced with ‘interaction,’ the systems under study are no longer 
only integrated by the operation. The interacting systems can both be integrated 
locally by action and at the same time differentiated in the reproduction. Interaction 
operates in cycles. 
 
The cycles may begin to resonate. Different levels of nested interactions can be 
distinguished analytically. The levels can be considered condensations of these 
recursive operations, that is, communications about communications. For example, 
Luhmann (1975) distinguished between ‘interaction,’ ‘organization,’ and ‘society.’ 
The interacting agents can be expected to remain different, although they are able to 
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exchange using an interface. When the networks reproduce distributions that are based 
on differences, the structural characteristics of these differences can be called 
‘differentiations.’ The interfaces then also tend to become institutionalized, for 
example, as organizations. 
 
Unlike symbolic interactionism with its pronounced focus on micro-level 
‘interactions,’ Luhmann proposed to consider ‘communication’ as the basic operation 
of social systems. From this perspective, ‘interaction’ can be considered as a specific 
form of organizing communications, notably face-to-face communication in the 
present. As in Giddens’s structuration theory, communications can also be aggregated 
and structured into contingent organizations and at the macro-level of society. 
 
The starting point of this social systems perspective is that every action can also be 
considered as a communication among human beings (Luhmann, 1984, at p. 149). 
What cannot be communicated, cannot be considered as part of a social system. It 
should be observed that this definition includes non-verbal communication. 
Interaction is then the specific form of communication in which the participants are 
reflexively aware of the contingencies in the communication because of each other’s 
presence. This ‘double contingency’ of the interaction structures action on both sides 
as a factor other than the individual lines of action. A structuration of the interactions 
can also be institutionalized, for example, in marriage. The reflexive awareness of the 
double contingencies and asymmetries in the mutual relations then induces cognition 
about the situation for each of the interacting actors. 
 
From this reflexive perspective, action can be redefined—as in symbolic 
interactionism—as attributed by a network of social relations. However, the network 
perspective stands orthogonally to the actor perspective: agency is no longer 
considered as the cause and communication as the attribute, but vice versa, and the 
system is grounded in communication. An actor may take action (or not) given one’s 
position in the network. The communication first provides the events happening with 
meaning. Meaning can be perceived by an actor (or not); reception is more crucial for 
interaction than taking action (Luhmann, 1990). 
 
Providing ‘meaning’ to the events is crucial to all human and inter-human systems: 
social systems operate in terms of generating and reproducing meaning. This 
conclusion can be considered as a common heritage shared among Weber’s sociology, 
Husserl’s phenomenology, and the American pragmatists. Human beings interact 
reflexively, that is, in relation to one another; they evaluate whatever they observe, 
and although they are able to distinguish between the dimensions of ‘facts’ and 
‘values’, the social science enterprise only takes off when the analysts also question 
what things mean to people. 
 
The generation of ‘meaning’ at the social level can be considered as a consequence of 
human interaction. Individuals are able to entertain ‘meaning’ also discretionarily, but 
‘meaning’ is reproduced by communication. Using a scheme from cybernetics, 
Luhmann then inverted the argument about the dynamics of meaning from the 
perspective of systems theory: human interaction can be reorganized by the social 
system of communications because social meaning is generated by interacting 
individuals. As meaning is repeatedly constructed bottom-up, the constructed (next-
 8
order) system tends to take over control when specific configurations can increasingly 
be stabilized.  
 
Social systems and individuals can be expected to process meaning differently 
(Luhmann, 1986). For example, individuals can further develop as identities that may 
manage to map meaning one-to-one to their subjectivities. The axis for the 
representation at the social level, however, stands orthogonally to the axis of internal 
processing by an individual. Whereas the individual processes thoughts and 
consciousness, the social system enables us to develop, among other things, discursive 
knowledge. 
 
 
The generation of a knowledge base 
 
When human beings interact, they generate uncertainty at the network level. One is 
able to handle this uncertainty because one has learned to cope with it by providing 
meaning to some actions and not to others. In the sociological literature, this has been 
discussed under the heading of the double contingency that provides meaning in social 
interactions (Parsons and Shills, 1951, at pp. 3-39; Parsons, 1968; Luhman, 1984, at 
pp. 148 ff.). 
 
Both uncertainty and meaning can be expected to circulate among human beings. 
Languages enable us to provide a communication with meaning and to distinguish the 
expected information content of the message at the same time. This dual processing 
can be considered as the evolutionary achievement that has enabled the social system 
to develop the complex dynamics of a cultural evolution. The system develops in 
substantive and reflexive layers at the same time, but potentially in an uncoordinated 
way. The social system then emerges as a dynamic and flexible coordination 
mechanism among different levels of expectations. 
 
The message provides meaning to the information contained in the message. For 
example, a word only has meaning in a sentence. Upon reception, the information can 
be rewritten as a signal of meaningful information and noise. This selective operation 
is recursive, that is, it can reflexively be applied upon itself. If the operation leaves 
traces over time, meaning can be invested in specific selections. The system can then 
provisionally be stabilized. In principle, stabilized systems can be further selected for 
globalization, that is, the historically achieved meaning can be compared with a 
horizon of possible meanings. Knowledge can then be developed as a next-order 
reflection allowing us to distinguish between meanings that make a difference and 
those which can provisionally be discarded as too uncertain. Thus, socially organized 
knowledge production further codifies the meaning-processing systems at a next-order 
layer.2 
 
The stabilization of discursive knowledge in the social subsystem of scientific 
communication can be considered as a cultural achievement of the Scientific 
                                                 
2 Does this mean that syntax would drive semantics? In a complex dynamics, the subdynamics (of 
syntax and semantics) do not drive each other, but co-produce the resulting phenomena by disturbing 
and constraining each other. The relative contributions of the subdynamics to the manifestations can 
vary situationally and over time. 
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Revolution of the 17th century. Individual knowledge production is then made 
interactive and in need of validation by communication. Modern sciences can no 
longer be understood in terms of the knowledge of single individuals. The study of the 
development of the sciences in terms of scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1962) has made 
us aware of the nature of social systems of communication as different from 
individual consciousness systems and their sum totals (Leydesdorff, 2001a). The 
social system contains surplus value based on the interactions among human beings 
and their aggregates into groups. 
 
The social system of interhuman expectations is initially nothing other than a plastic 
medium in which individuals process meaning and uncertainty, for example, by 
exchanging in these dimensions. When repeated over time the process can become 
increasingly structured. The media of social communication can become 
differentiated. A modern society, for example, is highly structured in terms of 
carefully constructed balances between different types of communication. 
 
The operating structure of the social system is reproduced at the level of the social 
system by using our individual contributions as a variety of inputs (e.g., knowledge 
claims). But the processing is highly structured. Thus, human beings are not external 
to the system, but ‘structurally coupled’ to it in terms of the distribution of their inputs 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980). The network of communications can be expected to drift 
into provisional solutions of the puzzle of how to communicate all these inputs in an 
efficient (albeit perhaps suboptimal) way. The individual contributions provide the 
variation, while communication structures select by reinforcing some variations and 
not others. 
 
The development of cognition as a next-order layer on each side—that is, at both the 
social level and within individuals—provides meaning-processing systems with 
another selective device that can feedback on lower-level selections and underlying 
variations. However, this mechanism is structured in social systems—Luhmann uses 
here the word ‘dividuum’—differently from in individuals. While individuals process 
cognition internally, the social system manages to construct—under the historical 
conditions of emerging modernity—discursive knowledge as a control system for 
(scientific) communications. 
 
 
Functional differentiation of the communication 
 
What does the social system add when the inputs are selected for organizing the 
communications? At this end, the sociologist can build on metaphors available since 
the founding fathers of the discipline (e.g., Comte), notably, that the social system can 
be expected to develop evolutionarily in stages. First, there was the primitive 
organization of society based on kinship relations. This can be considered as a 
segmented system. Next, civilizations were formed based on a hierarchical and 
stratified structuration of the processing of meaning. In this stage, the levels of 
organization provided the main differentiation. However, the one-to-one 
correspondence between levels and control functions can be dissolved under historical 
conditions. 
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When the organization of society could no longer be contained within a single 
hierarchy (at the end of the Middle Ages), another format was gradually invented in 
the social system, notably, that of functional differentiation. This new form was 
shaped in the 15th century, for example, when the House of Burgundy ruled over the 
Low Countries. The Dukes of Burgundy were neither Emperors (of Germany) nor 
Kings (of France) and, therefore, they suffered from a lack of religious legitimation 
for claiming autonomy. Given the social and power relations of the time, monetary 
unification was invented as a means to bind their ‘Empire of the Middle’ (between 
France and Germany) together. 
 
Philip the Good unified the monetary systems of Flanders, Brabant, Holland, and 
Hainault in 1433. In 1489, the silver ‘stuiver’ (or ‘sous’) was legally standardized as 
one twentieth of a golden guilder (florin) in all the Burgundian Netherlands 
(Groustra, 1995). This monetary union lasted until 1556. The coordination eroded 
because of the inflationary import of silver from the Spanish colonies during the 
1540s and the protestant uprisings in the Netherlands in the 1550s. When the Dutch 
revolt gained momentum in the 1570s and 1580s, the northern provinces also decided 
that they no longer needed a King ‘by the Grace of God,’ but that they could organize 
the political system as a republic. The sciences and the arts, once set free from 
religious control, could then begin to flourish. The principle of functional 
differentiation entails that various symbolically mediated communication systems can 
operate to solve problems in society in a heterarchical mode, that is, alongside each 
other. Over time, these parallel systems can develop functionality for one another. 
Functionality, however, is further developed along orthogonal dimensions. Thus, one 
can expect that it will take time to develop from the stage of a breakdown of the 
horizontally stratified hierarchy into differentiation with functions along orthogonal 
axes as another mode of social organization. 
 
The different function systems use various codes for providing meaning to the 
communication. Whereas the hierarchical (catholic) system had only a single center of 
control—that was based on a holy text—economic exchange relations, for example, 
could now be handled by making payments. The symbolically generalized medium of 
money makes it no longer necessary to communicate by negotiating prices verbally or 
imposing them by force. The specification of a price as an expected market value 
speeds up the economic transaction processes by organizing the communication in a 
specific (that is, functionally codified) format.  
 
Functional differentiation first had to be invented and then also accepted as a solution 
to coordination problems at the level of the social system, for example, by recognizing 
privacy (e.g., in love relations) vis-à-vis public relations, market relations for 
exchange, and political state formation as different domains of communication. After 
the ‘phase transition’ from a hierarchical mode of communication to one in which 
functionality prevailed, the differentiation began to feed back on the institutional 
organization of society, for example, by questioning the functionality of the traditional 
organization. This was then reflected in an emerging discourse (during the 18th 
century and notably in France) about desirable forms of social organization. 
 
Luhmann has emphasized in a series of studies entitled Gesellschaftsstruktur und 
Semantik (‘The Structure of Society and Semantics’) that although the semantic 
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reflection is needed for stabilizing the functional differentiation, functional 
differentiation of communication should not be considered as a process within 
language, but one that precedes language structurally, that is, at the level of society. 
The communication becomes functionally differentiated as a social order; the 
semantic reflection and codification can be expected to lag behind. This social process 
of changing the mode of organizing communications among human beings can be 
expected to take centuries, and it cannot fully be completed because the complex 
system builds upon subdynamics that contain and reproduce forms of less complex 
organization as their building blocks.  
 
For example, the hierarchical order of the communication in language with only Latin 
and then French as the lingua franca, was gradually replaced with a segmented system 
of ‘natural languages’ which could exist alongside each other as more or less 
equivalent. A system of nation states emerged in the 19th century as a sustainable form 
of shaping institutional structures that reintegrated the different functions in specific 
forms of organization. The prevailing tendency towards functional differentiation, 
however, is continuously upsetting the historical arrangements. Functional 
differentiation allows for handling more complexity at the global level since it is based 
on a next-order reconstruction. The reconstruction transforms all ‘natural’ (given) 
forms by infusing them with knowledge-based inventions. The global system, 
however, is constrained in terms of the development of retention mechanisms that 
enable its reproduction. 
 
 
The evolutionary mechanism 
 
The American and French revolutions can perhaps be considered as the first deliberate 
attempts to reorganize a society institutionally so that it would be able to sustain the 
pluriform multiplicity of functions that characterize a modern society. The functional 
domains (e.g., markets, sciences) can be considered as global subsystems of 
communication, but at lower levels specific formats had to be generated in order to 
optimize the processing of information and meaning locally. While ‘interaction’ 
occurs also spontaneously between people, organizations have to be constructed. 
 
Under the condition of functional differentiation, three levels can be distinguished at 
which one can expect that the function systems are recombined (cf. Luhmann, 1975): 
(i) in ‘interaction’ as face-to-face communication; (ii) organization in a social system 
provides criteria to distinguish those who are within from those external to a specific 
domain; and (iii) society can be considered as the coordination mechanism among 
functions at the global level. These three levels reconstruct segmentation, hierarchical 
stratification, and heterarchical differentiation of meaning processing, respectively. 
The organization of integration in institutions is thus analytically distinguished from 
the ongoing processes of functional differentiation among the globalizing subsystems 
(such as the economy and the sciences). The interfaces make possible translations 
among codes that provide different meanings to communications. But the interfaces 
have first to be invented and developed at specific places. 
 
The functional subsystems operate by coding the communications specifically: for 
example, the market codes in terms of prices and payments, the sciences code 
 12
communications in terms of whether they can be considered as functional for truth-
finding and puzzle-solving, and political discourses code communication in terms of 
whether power and legitimation can be organized. Intimate relations code in terms of 
love and affection. The integrating levels, however, are not specific in terms of what is 
being coded. They solve the puzzle of how to interface the differences in codings 
locally. Agents at these different levels of aggregation can be expected to contribute to 
the differentiation by translating among differently coded meanings. 
 
A range of global functions can be expected to resonate in inter-human 
communication. Functional differentiation means that some dimensions can be 
selected and others deselected in specific orders of communication. The integrating 
mechanisms can be considered as functional for organizing the differentiated 
communications at lower levels. They serve the retention of previously achieved 
levels of sophistication in the communication—or they may fail to do so. If they 
repeatedly fail to do so, an organization can be dissolved and replaced, yet without 
seriously affecting the dynamics of functional differentiation that can be expected to 
prevail at the global level. 
 
This theorizing would remain completely speculative if it were not possible to develop 
empirical research questions on its basis. The historical example of how a monetary 
standard was developed at the end of the Middle Ages, provided us above with a first 
example of how one can use this theory as a heuristics for studying evolutionary 
developments in social processes. But can we also apply these methods more 
quantitatively and analytically? (Leydesdorff & Oomes, 1999) 
 
What does a communication system do when it communicates? It selects a system’s 
state for a communication. A social communication system can be expected to contain 
a very large number of system states, since the number of possible states increases 
with the number of the carrying agencies in the exponent. For example, if one throws 
two dice, one has 62 (= 36) possible combinations. N dice would provide us with 6N 
possibilities, and similarly a group of ten people with six media for communication 
would allow for 610, or more than 60 million possible combinations. A 
communication actualizes one or a few of these possibilities. 
 
A large number of the actualizations may be volatile. One communication follows 
upon another without necessarily leaving traces. Selections then remain juxtaposed 
or, in other words, they are not correlated. However, selections may become 
correlated (if only by chance) in two respects, notably at the same moment in time 
and over the time axis. Along the time axis, ‘variation’ can be considered as change 
in relation to stability in the selections. At each moment in time, ‘variation’ can be 
considered as the sum of local disturbances, whereas structure selects for the 
function of this input. Structure, however, has to be built up historically before it can 
act as a systematic selector. In summary, a stabilized (and therefore observable) 
system contains two types of selections that operate concurrently: one by the 
network at each moment in time, and another over the time axis. 
 
Note that the medium of communication thus provides us with a first constraint. 
When written communication is available to a social system, additional mechanisms 
of transmission become possible other than interactions and signaling in the present 
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(Meyrowitz, 1994). Writing, however, has to be historically invented. As long as a 
communication system is mainly based on direct interaction, the span of 
communication is limited, and the selected states of the systems remain mainly 
juxtaposed. This can be recognized as a segmented order of social communications. 
 
Writing is highly associated with the introduction of a new mode of control of 
communication, notably, the stabilization of a civilization (Innis, 1950). The 
mechanism of written communication enables cultures to span time periods at the 
supra-individual level and thus to stabilize systems of communication. Because the 
communication can also be saved for considerable periods of time, the new 
communications can be correlated to older ones and the selection of specific system 
states can be stabilized. Time breaks the symmetry in the mutual selections of a 
coevolution. Over time some previous selections can be selected for stabilization. In 
the phase space of possible selections the system then begins to develop along a 
trajectory. The shape of the historical trajectory is contingent upon the selections 
that the system manages to handle structurally. For example, a social system in 
which one is only able to write on clay tablets can be expected to develop differently 
from a social system in which papyrus or parchment have been invented. The 
relations between hierarchical interaction (command structures) and face-to-face 
interactions will vary among systems that are differently mediated. 
 
Within civilizations based on hierarchies, the top of the hierarchy may be a king or 
an emperor with divine attributes. However, the prevalence of communication in the 
command structure can also become reflected. The invention of a holy text (e.g., the 
Bible) that integrates the system at a level more abstract than the physical presence 
of an emperor or king changes the cosmology. A civilization based on a more 
abstract set of principles can be considered as a high culture. But the reliance on 
communication—instead of physical force—as the basis for control is self-defeating 
in the long run because the constructed order needs to be enforced and the 
communicated order can then be recognized reflexively as historically specific.  
 
The invention of new dimensions for the communication that can also be codified at 
the social level can be expected to turn the tables sooner or later (Arthur, 1988 and 
1989). When the social system gains an additional degree of freedom, the new 
dimension allows the communicators to evade the dilemma of the two previously 
competing orders. At the edges of the spheres of influence between the Pope and the 
Emperor, for example, in city-states in Northern Italy and in the envisaged ‘Empire 
of the Middle’ in northern Europe one could develop trade, art, and sciences.  The 
new communication structures would eventually challenge the catholic order 
spanning a single universe and its corresponding cosmology. The new order of 
communications can endure different dimensions of communication developing next 
to each other as different structures. Thus, the system recombines the advantages of 
segmented and stratified communication by inventing the mode of functional 
differentiation. Functional differentiation entails that communications can be 
distinguished with reference to the function of the communication. This provides 
new dimensions that were not available in a high culture.  
 
For example, when the Netherlands were invaded by the French army in 1672, the 
Prince of Orange needed legitimation for the upcoming negotiations. He sent for 
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Spinoza to join his cortège in order to impress the French generals. That Spinoza 
had been banned by the jewish and protestant churches for religious reasons was not 
in the interest of the Prince. In a functionally differentiated society, the 
representatives of functions can tolerate moderate conflict because the social system 
is no longer expected to process a single solution.  
 
An order among the various function systems can be selected and reconstructed in a 
next round of reflections. If this additional degree of freedom can also be stabilized, 
this process globalizes the functional differentiation of the system. Some 
(provisional) stabilizations can be selected for globalization. Globalization, 
however, does not imply that a global system physically and/or meta-physically 
‘exists.’ The functions refer only to a supersystem for which the subsystems can 
analytically be made functional. Initially, the existence of this supersystem remained 
a religious assumption; for example, Descartes’ belief in the Goodness of God 
(Veracitas Dei) which would prevent Him from deceiving us all the time. Religious 
constructions like Leibniz’ harmonie préétablie would guarantee a cosmological 
order in the universe. 
 
Since the social system, however, continuously fails ‘to exist’ at the global level in a 
strong (physical or biological) sense—it remains a system of expectations—the 
organization of society can be expected to operate with the tensions between 
functional differentiation and locally organized integration of the communication. In 
the 18th century, the Constitution was invented as an presumably ‘universal’ text that 
would bind all communicating agencies as members of a nation state. Soon, it 
became clear that each nation would have to develop its own constitution. The 
constitutions organized institutional systems of checks and balances that enabled the 
political economy to further develop on the basis of the level of functional 
differentiation that was achieved in the first half of the 19th century. From this 
perspective, nations can be considered as institutional arrangements that include and 
exclude on the basis of nationality. In terms of evolution theory, they can be 
compared with niches. In ecology, niches are functional for the retention because 
they reorganize the complex environment by stabilizing boundaries. 
 
When the system of nation states was completed (by approximately 1870), the 
national systems contained mechanisms for solving the major tensions between the 
state and civic society so that the function systems could be integrated locally, yet in 
a competing mode. From 1870 onwards, the social system has developed a new 
dimension to further improve these ‘national’ solutions. This new dimension can 
with hindsight be characterized as organized knowledge production and control 
(Whitley, 1984). 
 
 
Technological developments as inter-system dependencies 
 
The sciences have developed continuously since the Scientific Revolution of the 17th 
century (Price, 1961), but the fully developed political economies of the 19th century 
provided the sciences with an institutional basis for further development. When the 
disciplines and the specialties then differentiated among themselves and in relation 
to their social contexts, the idea of a single and universal science had gradually to be 
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abandoned. Interfaces with private appropriation by entrepreneurship and public 
control in science and technology policies were increasingly developed. Within 
science, the proliferation of disciplines and specialties made it possible to dissolve 
the idea of a single ‘truth’ to be discovered by science. One could proceed to a mode 
of ‘truth-finding’ and empirical ‘puzzle-solving’ (Simon, 1969). Thus, the code of 
scientific communication became internally differentiated (Gibbons et al., 1994; 
Leydesdorff, 2001b). 
 
Can the function systems also differentiate and complexify in terms of their 
interactions? In his 1990 study entitled Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (The 
Science of Society), Luhmann formulated on p. 340: 
 
 The differentiation of society changes also the social system in which it occurs, and 
this can again be made the subject of scientific theorizing.  However, this is only 
possible if an accordingly complex systems theoretical arrangement can be 
specified (translation, LL). 
 
Is the post-modern order thus eroding the system of functional differentiation 
(Sevänen, 2001)? When studying the so-called ‘techno-sciences’ as interface 
organizations with their own dynamics, one leaves the model of functional 
differentiation behind (Callon, 1998). Algorithmic models are needed which allow 
for next-order effects that are neither intended nor expected. Technological 
trajectories and regimes (Dosi, 1982), for example, can then be considered as 
endogenous consequences of non-linear interactions at the interfaces between the 
sciences (‘supply’) and markets (‘demand’). 
 
Luhmann (2000, at p. 396) has discussed the organization of interfaces as structural 
interruptions of the communicative order at the global level. As he formulated it: 
 
Society has to develop beyond functional differentiation and use another principle of 
systems formation in order to gain the ultrastability and therefore sufficient local capacity to 
absorb irritations by providing organization. 
 
What might this ultra-stabilization of an interaction between functionally 
differentiated sub-systems mean?  Stability requires a form of integration by 
organization. Indeed, an important condition for the development of modern high-
tech sciences seems to be the increasing integration of political, economic, and 
scientific orientations in research practices (Gibbons et al. 1994).   
 
Professional practices can be considered as organized interaction systems that allow 
for specific recombinations of integration and differentiation in new roles. 
Integration in the sense of de-differentiation, however, would be evolutionarily 
unlikely, since the social system might then lose its capacity to handle complexity. 
Thus, these constructed interaction systems are heavily organized, but from the 
perspective of interactions.  
 
Alternatively, the constructions can be shaped at the level of interactions among 
organizations. For example, technological developments can be considered as the 
result of inter-systemic resonances which have been stabilized as new functions in 
the social system during the last century. The stabilization of interfaces and the 
 16
discursive construction of integration can then be considered as instances of an 
emerging next-order of global communications.   
 
This higher-order communication can be expected to contain a new epistèmè 
(Foucault, 1972 [1969], at p. 191): in addition to the communication of substantive 
novelty and methodologically warranted codification (‘truth’), high-tech sciences, 
for example, are translating representations of subsystems of society into scientific 
knowledge by modeling them, and vice versa, by legitimating research results in 
‘trans-epistemic’ cycles of communication (Knorr-Cetina, 1982 and 1999). In other 
words, one is institutionally warranted in changing the code of the communication, 
for example, because of a flexible division of labour within the research community. 
 
The emerging patterns of the high-tech sciences are not expected to replace the older 
models, but to encompass them and to guide their future development. The next-
order regime entrains the trajectories on which it builds (Kampmann et al., 1994). In 
other words, ‘high tech’ and ‘big science’ can be considered as results of an 
‘epistemic drift’ of translations between economic innovations and research 
questions; and vice versa, of the possibility to merge fundamental and applied 
research questions in terms of selections of relevant representations (Elzinga, 1985 
and 1992). These newly emerging communication systems contain more than a 
single codification, and additionally they are able to translate between these 
codifications internally by using a spiral model of communication. Using computer 
simulations, for example, developments can be analyzed in terms of processes of 
representation and communication within relevant scientific-political-economic 
communities (Ahrweiler, 1995): high-tech sciences develop by communicating in 
terms of recursive selections on interactively constructed representations. 
 
In my opinion, the emergence of ‘big science’ and patterns of international 
collaborations in science during the second half of the 20th century can be 
considered as the institutional acculturation of the new epistèmè. The reflexive 
reorganization of these institutional patterns by using new forms of S&T policies 
was apparently delayed until the second oil crisis of 1979, when the post-war system 
entered into a serious crisis at the level of the global economy.  The gradual 
development of stable patterns of scientific reproduction in fields like ‘artificial 
intelligence’, ‘biotechnology’, and ‘advanced materials’ in the 1980s and 1990s 
indicates the viability of a new mode of scientific communication.  
 
 
The globalization of the knowledge base of expectations 
 
The local networks of institutions like universities, industries, and governments can 
be considered as carriers of a next order of potentially global communications. 
These systems can then be expected to go through a phase transition in terms of their 
need for new communicative competencies. The translations no longer occur 
between ‘natural’ languages, but between functional codes of communications that 
are themselves entrained in a flux. This next-oder system emerges within the system 
as its globalization. The existence of a global system, however, remains a 
hypothesis. Since this hypothesis is entertained and communicated, the global level 
potentially restructures the expectation structures in the globalizing systems. By 
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being transformed on this basis, all ‘naturally given’ or ‘historically constructed’ 
bases of underlying systems tend to become increasingly ‘knowledge-based’. 
 
Remember that some selections were selected for stabilization along the time axis. 
By globalizing the system entertains the time axis no longer as a historical 
symmetry-breaking mechanism, but as another dimension. The local realization can 
then be evaluated from a global, that is, knowledge-based perspective. The global 
perspective operates on the present state of the system by enabling us to entertain the 
idea that what has historically been constructed ‘ain’t necessarily so.’ In other 
words, it can always be reconstructed on the basis of new insights.  
 
A knowledge-based system operates on the basis of the current state of the system as 
one of its possible representations. Each historical representation can be compared to 
others. The global perspective adds an expectation to the local perspectives. Since 
the various perspectives compete for the explanation of what can be expected to 
occur, neither the global nor the local perspective can claim priority. The 
perspectives remain analytically juxtaposed (as hypotheses!), but they interact. As 
noted, this means at the level of ‘organization’ that the single organization is 
increasingly networked and that the inter-institutional arrangements become more 
important for the functionality of organization than the single perspective.  
 
What does this globalization of the knowledge-base mean for ‘interaction’? It seems 
to me that this can already be observed, for example, in the form of the role of e-
mail communication as an addition to previously existing forms of interaction. We 
have increasingly become aware that interaction is mediated and that one can 
entertain various forms of interaction with different objectives. Furthermore, one is 
increasingly able to anticipate interactively the unintended consequences of previous 
communications. Interactions can thus be expected to become increasingly 
recognizable as translations among differently coded communications.  
 
The programmatic view of symbolic interactions that interactions can only be 
concatenated bottom-up in order to inform us about social structure can then no 
longer be maintained without running into serious problems. The methodological 
restrictions of micro-constructivism have practical implications. Interactions are 
situated, and thus next-order levels of nested interactions and communications can 
be expected to resonate within the observables. The situation is overdetermined by 
expectations based on hypothetical structures. The systems theoretical program in 
sociology adds and informs the hypotheses about the feedback loops within the 
interactions that it studies.  
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